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Christian Lotz 
The Capitalist Schema: Time, Money, and the Culture of Abstraction 
Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014. 191pp., £49.95 hb. 
ISBN 9780739182468 
Reviewed by: Frederick H. Pitts 
The Capitalist Schema is a significant intervention into current reinterpretations of Marx’s 
theory of value. Eschewing the Hegelian heritage of much value-form theory, Christian Lotz 
gives a Kantian interpretation of the law of value. This states that the money form works 
along schematic lines. Money, for Lotz, establishes the conditions of possible experience 
and the social thinghood of objects. The book gives the clearest exposition yet of the real 
abstraction by which all things enter into relation with all other things. In so doing, it 
surpasses earlier attempts to outline the schematic quality of the capitalist exchange 
relation. Lotz’s is the most sophisticated and extensive development of the link between 
the law of value and the Kantian schematism yet given. Adopting critical distance from the 
early Frankfurt School, it represents a brilliant advancement of the theoretical project 
begun by Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1971).  
Chapter One presents a social-material understanding of the Kantian schematism by way of 
Marx and Adorno. Chapters Two and Three outline the centrality of money as the arbiter of 
‘thinghood’ necessary to access objects. Chapter Four examines the temporal dimensions of 
the schema, with past and future understood through the credit-debt nexus. Chapter Five 
argues that abstract culture issues from ‘industries that take on the whole mental 
apparatus of capitalist individuals’ (xxi). Thought, experience and reflection are not neutral 
external material moulded by the culture industry. Rather, the capacities themselves are 
produced by ‘consciousness industries’. 
Lotz situates his work in a Kantian philosophical tradition. Thus, ‘everything we think and 
do is…filtered through a schema'. This 'structures every reference and makes the relation 
between subject and object possible’ (5). Where Lotz breaks with Kant’s psychological 
explanation is in his social-materialist approach. This book is a response to two meetings 
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with Kant on this terrain: Marx’s critique of political economy and Adorno’s critical theory. 
Two moments, one each in the oeuvres of Marx and Adorno, are important for Lotz.  
Firstly, Lotz tells us that the argument of The Capitalist Schema can be traced to a passage 
in the Grundrisse. Here, Marx contends that the money-form performs the same function as 
the rational schematism in Kant’s idealist philosophy. This schematism ‘makes it possible 
for a rational being to access and represent objects for the subject’. Through it, reason 
establishes ‘a framework under which all objects…make sense and can exist’ (xvi). 
Secondly, Lotz emphasises the importance of a ‘side note’ from the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Here, Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that Hollywood and the culture 
industry are ‘foreshadowed’ by the Kantian schematism (2). Lotz critiques the 
conceptualisation of the culture industry as a psychological ‘filtering’ and ‘prefiguring’ of 
social meaning. He argues that it is an element of a ‘social-material schema’ that is itself 
capitalist, rather than prior to it. 
Lotz’s critique of Adorno centres upon his failure to complete the transformation of Kant’s 
‘epistemological point of view into a critical point of view’. This is owing to the absence of a 
proper critique of political economy in his work (15). Lotz suggests that Adorno’s analysis 
remains stuck at surface level. It treats exchange as the ‘central concept of capitalism’. But 
for Lotz, exchange is itself ‘derive[d] from other social categories’ (xiv). Solving this 
oversight with recourse to Marx, Lotz claims to advance on Adorno.  
But one need not look far beyond the book itself to counter Lotz’s claim that Adorno lacks a 
critique of political economy. After repeatedly asserting that Adorno has no political 
economy, in the final footnoted words of the book Lotz admits that Adorno does in fact 
‘seem[] to realize the role of political economy in his later writings and lectures’ (n. 1, 157). 
Bonefeld (ibid., n. 19, 14) quotes Braunstein (2008), who argues that there is a ‘genuinely 
Adornian version of critique of political economy’. This, we are told, is evidenced in 
unpublished, posthumously uncovered and documentary material. Braunstein's work is not 
cited by Lotz, and the implied obscurity of these sources may account for his having 
overlooked this side of Adorno’s output. For instance, the 1962 seminar notes of Hans-
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Georg Backhaus (1997), uncited by Lotz, feature Adorno’s consideration of ‘socially 
necessary abstract labour time’ (quoted in Bonefeld 2014, 127). 
But Lotz's critique goes deeper than finding and plugging gaps. Lotz labels Adorno a 
‘romantic’ (23) guilty of ‘use-value fetishism’. For Adorno, the development of exchange 
corrupts the enjoyment of use-values themselves. According to Lotz, this employs a 
historical view of the contradictory relationship between the two sides of the commodity. 
For Lotz, Marx’s exposition of value is presentational, not chronological (20).  
But rather than ‘use-value fetishism’, Adorno advocates a ‘utopia of the qualitative'. He 
celebrates 'the things which through their difference and uniqueness cannot be absorbed 
into the prevalent exchange relationships' (2005, 120). It just so happens that this tends to 
be bound up in use-value in a capitalist society. But Adorno does not appeal to one side of 
the commodity over the other. He is against the abstraction from use. He is against the 
abstraction from difference, particularity and quality that commodification brings about. If 
this requires a historical frame of reference, as Lotz asserts Adorno is wont to use, whereby 
some kind of ‘return’ is envisioned, or a development desired undone, then this defies only 
the most logical and presentational understanding of Marx’s theory. As Bonefeld has 
recently argued, Marx ends Capital with primitive accumulation because he works from 
present to past, akin to the understanding of the ape by means of the man. Only through 
adopting a historical standpoint can Adorno understand the possibility of escape: from 
quantity into quality, from homogeneity into heterogeneity, and from universality into 
particularity.  
Indicative of Lotz’s critique of Adorno is his assessment of the passage on child’s play from 
Minima Moralia. In this passage, Adorno describes the ‘purposeless activity’ of pushing 
‘little trucks…nowhere’, with their ‘tiny barrels’ empty. In this activity, children side with 
‘use-value against exchange value’. They withdraw from the ‘process of abstraction’ 
constituted by the ‘exchange relation’. They suggest that which is ‘benign towards men’ 
(2005, 228). But Lotz asserts that the distinction between use and exchange that Adorno 
employs is itself a ‘result of capitalist reproduction’. He attributes this to Adorno’s 
association of capitalism solely with the exchange principle (22).  
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In this regard, Lotz suggests that Adorno and Horheimer overlook the industrial and 
productive dimensions of abstraction. Lotz suggests replacing 'culture industry' with 
‘consciousness industries’. His point is to show that the schema cannot be reduced to 
exchange (23-24). Lotz implies that Adorno and Horkheimer’s account is too 
‘circulationist’. But the labour and production to which Lotz wishes to shift focus are 
inadequately theorised here. There seems no persuasive account of why we should not see 
the exchange principle as the ultimate source of the capitalist schema. Lotz emphasises the 
status of labour as the ‘substance of social reality’, whilst acknowledging its abstract form 
(35). But this is not fully explicated. The relationship between this substantialist approach 
to labour and Lotz's auspicious anti-substantialism is unclear.  
For instance, Lotz takes a productivist position against the supposed circulationism of 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s account of the culture industry. The ‘technologies’ undergirding 
the capitalist schema are ‘abstract units’ that ‘exist in the means of production’. This relates 
to the claim that labour is the reproductive 'hinge' of the capitalist schema. These 
productive technologies produce the individuals for which the ‘frame’ applies (7). For Lotz, 
it is ‘consciousness industries’ that produce the very human material upon which the 
schema works. They differ from Adorno and Horkheimer's 'culture industry', which the 
latter suggest produces the schema itself.  
But ‘production’ here is ill-defined. How can we see it apart from the framework of the 
schema? As Lotz himself cites Marx as having suggested, ‘to speak of production “as such” is 
an empty abstraction’ (154). The production that takes place in Lotz’s ‘consciousness 
industries’ involves labour as a 'hinge' that reproduces the frame. But we cannot speak of 
labour as productive except by means of the exchange abstraction. The understanding of 
what is productive, then, arises through the capitalist schema. It would be impossible to 
speak of something being productive without it having value. Value is subject to its 
exchangeability in the social realm rather than anything resting in the sphere of 
production. As such, the category of ‘production’ (or ‘productiveness’) cannot pre-exist the 
exchange principle. On this reading, the capitalist schema must rest in exchange. 
Lotz pays lip-service to labour where it is not necessary to do so. How can we know that 
labour is ‘the true substance of society and wealth’, except through the framework of the 
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capitalist schema? How else than through the potential or actual conferral of monetary 
value? To be consistent with Lotz’s own theory, we should say that labour has no 
independent significance outside its abstract monetary appearance. Despite the status of 
labour as the ‘hinge’ upon which the reproduction of the schema depends, for Lotz the 
capitalist schema moves through money (22). This compromises his ability to talk about 
labour and production as alternative poles of explanation against exchange. 
Lotz suggests that, if the schema orders reality according to potential monetary value, then 
it is impossible to redeem anything in the way Adorno suggests. But Adorno’s appeal to the 
utopia of the qualitative need not fall on these grounds. Everything is potentially 
exchangeable and monetary. But everything is just as easily potentially otherwise. Lotz 
examines the claims of those who would suggest that there are things that fall outside or 
are unassimilable within commodity exchange. This includes ‘forms of exchange that are 
not based on commodities'. He cites Kojin Karatani’s position that the family is one such 
‘pre-commercial’ or ‘non-commercial’ form. Against this, Lotz states that value is not a 
thing, but sociality itself. It is a potentiality for anything that meaningfully 'exists'. This 
potential differentiates love and family in capitalist society from love and family in a non-
capitalist society. Maintaining and reproducing the family in capitalist society proceeds 
through the money-form. The family is ‘unthinkable’ outside the money-form and the nexus 
of social relationships that it implies (41). 
But ‘unthinkability’ for Lotz relates to the ever-present potentiality that things can take a 
monetary form. This potentiality need not be realised for things to be accessible and 
granted objecthood. All that matters is that the potentiality exists. But on this basis, 
potentiality works both ways. It can be potentially this or potentially that. This is the key 
principle of a dialectic approach. Adorno’s passage on the family in Minima Moralia 
suggests what is at stake. Adorno writes that ‘it sometimes seems as if the fatal germ-cell of 
society, the family, were at the same time the nurturing germ-cell of uncompromising 
pursuit of another’. It is both an ‘agency of the bourgeoisie’, and a potential mode of 
resistance and ‘force[] of opposition’ (2005, 22-23). Something understood on its potential 
to be one thing, is just as well understood on its potential to be another. 
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Adorno sees a challenge to the rule of capital, the logic of abstraction, the commodified 
world, by means of family and fidelity. ‘The fidelity exacted by society is a means to 
unfreedom,’ Adorno writes. But 'only through fidelity can freedom achieve insubordination 
to society’s command’ (2005, 172). How striking, then, that we should find an uncanny 
resonance between this position and a passage in Lotz’s book. Lotz himself repeats 
Adorno’s ‘romantic’ attachment to the thing itself in the context of love. ‘The person who is 
passionately in love with something or someone and devotes all of his or her libido towards 
one object', he writes, 'is the real enemy of an industry that wants us to disperse all 
attention and redirect it towards valorization. Keeping attention means not only that one 
gives primacy to the object, but also that one can wait for what the object “will do”’ (126).  
Here Lotz departs from his downbeat assessment of the schematisation of human 
experience by the money-form. There is something redeemable in love that challenges 
rather than succumbs to the control of the consciousness industries. What is this if not the 
recognition that potentiality works both ways, and that Adorno’s romantic utopianism 
projects a possible way out of the pessimistic scenario Lotz paints? Lotz’s assessment of the 
role of money in determining our experiential access to reality invites no easy prescription 
for escape. But Lotz’s conceptualisation of potentiality invites uses unanticipated within his 
bleak outlook. Thinking dialectically, we can take small comforts from Adorno that Lotz is 
loath to offer. 
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